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Abstract 
Experiments have to be objective and intersubjectively controllable, and the experimental report must not make 
use of rhetorical tools that aim merely at persuading the reader but it has to allow the reader a direct access to the 
experimental evidence. At the same time, however, the reliability of psycholinguistic experiments does not seem 
to stem from an impersonal and straightforward linkage between “empirical facts” and hypotheses. Rather, it 
depends crucially on the peculiarities and the plausibility of the argumentation put forward in the experimental 
report, on its persuasiveness and its convincing force. The present paper aims at resolving this problem that I call 
the rhetorical paradox of psycholinguistic experiments.  
Keywords: psycholinguistic experiments, rhetoric, plausible argumentation, philosophy of science 
1 Introduction 
According to Geeraert’s diagnosis, one important step that cognitive linguistics should take in 
order to reach the status of a scientific enterprise, is the application of empirical methods used 
successfully within other branches of cognitive science:  
Cognitive Linguistics, if we may believe the name, is a cognitive science, i.e. it is one of those scientific 
disciplines that study the mind […]. It would seem obvious then, that the methods that have proved their 
value in the cognitive sciences at large have a strong position in Cognitive Linguistics: the experimental 
techniques of psychology, computer modelling, and neurophysiologic research. (Geeraerts 2006: 28; 
emphasis as in the original) 
Thus, the recent development, namely that reference to psycholinguistic experiments is 
regarded as one of the most powerful tools in argumentations in favour of, or against, theories 
in cognitive metaphor research, might be interpreted in such a way that in this field of 
cognitive linguistics, similarly to cognitive psychology, the idea of treating experimental 
results as strong evidence for, or against, theories is prevalent. This means that experiments in 
cognitive metaphor research can, or at least should, be characterised along similar lines as in 
psycholinguistics, insofar as  
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 […] there is a common, commonly accepted way in psycholinguistics of settling theoretical disputes: 
experimentation. Given a number of conditions, experimental results decide between competing analyses, 
and psycholinguists predominantly accept the experimental paradigm as the cornerstone of their 
discipline. (Geeraerts 2006: 26)  
This authority is usually based on the view that experiments allow for confronting hypotheses 
of theories directly with empirical evidence. In this vein, experiments have to be objective and 
intersubjectively controllable, and apply feasible, well-established procedures providing 
completely reliable experimental data: 
The conditions that need to be fulfilled to make the paradigm work are in principle simple: the experiment 
has to be adequately carried out, and it has to be properly designed in order to be distinctive with regard 
to the competing theories. That is to say, you need good experimental training (knowledge of techniques 
and analytical tools), and you need the ability to define a relevant experimental design. The bulk of the 
effort in psycholinguistic research, in other words, involves attending to these two conditions: setting up 
adequate designs, and carrying out the design while paying due caution to experimental validity. 
(Geeraerts 2006: 26) 
The experimental report has to transmit these characteristics and must not make use of 
rhetorical tools aimed merely at persuading the reader. From this it follows that the reliability of 
experiments is supposed to be inversely proportional to the rhetoricity of the experimental report. 
If, however, we take a closer look at papers dealing with psycholinguistic experiments in 
cognitive metaphor research, we never actually see the “raw” (numerical) data capturing some 
observation of linguistic behaviour and a chain of deductively valid inferences leading to the 
result of the experiment and the latter’s confrontation with some hypotheses or theories. 
Instead, a typical experimental report seems to be a highly complex argumentation which is 
not strictly deductive. It usually contains, among other things, the following components (not 
necessarily in this order):  
– main tenets, explanatory power, and other strengths of the preferred theory;  
– central hypotheses and weak points of the rival theories; 
– description of a phenomenon in connection with which the theory and its rivals propose 
different predictions;  
– motivation and description of the experiment to be conducted and conjectures about its 
outcome; 
– details and shortcomings of earlier similar experiments; 
– description and results of control experiments aimed at ruling out some known possible 
systematic errors;  
– no “raw data” (individual measurements) at all; 
– some excerpts from the stimulus material used; 
– type and upshot of statistical analyses; 
– presentation of considerations concerning the interpretation and reliability of the results; 
– if there seem to be shortcomings in the experiment, then a second experiment is proposed, 
carried out and its results are analysed, too; 
– the impact of the conducted experiment on the theory at hand and its rivals;  
– proposals for further inquiry in the given topic etc.  
 
It is plain to see that the relationship between the “raw data” (that is, the complete set of 
individual measurements) and hypotheses of the linguistic theory or theories at issue cannot be 
completely reconstructed on the basis of the information provided in the experimental report. 
Consequently, far from being direct and transparent this relationship is quite fragmentary. 
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Despite this, it is the experimental report on the basis of which one decides whether the given 
experiment is a reliable data source. Compelling, lucid and reasonable experimental reports are 
regarded as indications of good, reliable experiments and, conversely, poor, shaky, faulty 
experimental reports lead to the rejection of the experiment itself as well. Therefore, the 
authority of psycholinguistic experiments does not stem from an impersonal and 
straightforward linkage between “empirical facts” and hypotheses. Rather, it seems to depend 
crucially on the peculiarities and plausibility of the argumentation put forward in the 
experimental report, on its persuasiveness and its convincing force. From this we obtain that the 
reliability of experiments is directly proportional to the rhetoricity of the experimental report. 
Thus, our considerations have led to a paradox: 
 
(RPE) The rhetorical paradox of psycholinguistic experiments:  
 The reliability of psycholinguistic experiments as data sources is both directly and 
inversely proportional to the rhetoricity of the experimental report. 
 
The present paper will focus on the following problem: 
 
(P1) How can (RPE) be resolved? 
 
If we examine the two contradictory members of (RPE), two promising starting points present 
themselves: 
 
1) While the view which considers rhetorical tools unnecessary and worthless is a 
methodological rule, the opposite view refers to the practice of linguistic research. This 
should motivate us to raise the question of whether the first view is an adequate norm, 
and, if not, then under what circumstances is the practice of presenting the results of 
experiments in cognitive metaphor research acceptable? That is, the criteria for judging 
the rhetoricity of experiments should be revealed. 
2) The two contradictory views use the concept ‘rhetoric’ in different senses. The first view 
reduces it to irrational tricks and manoeuvres, erroneously claiming that the experiment 
provides reliable results. In sharp contrast to this, the second view allows room for 
interpreting ‘rhetoric’ as rational argumentation that may be fully legitimate and should 
be an important constituent of scientific experiments.  
 
These findings impel us to transform (P1) to (P2):  
 
(P2) What kind of ‘argumentation’ is allowed in reports on psycholinguistic experiments 
and what functions does it fulfil? 
 
(P2) is a metascientific problem that, according to the current literature on experiments in the 
philosophy of science, cannot be solved on the basis of general and abstract, a priori 
philosophical considerations, but only with the help of detailed analyses and the evaluation of 
research practice. 
 
In order to provide a possible solution to (P1) and (P2), we will proceed as follows. Section 2 
will be devoted to a brief historical overview of the manifold relationship between 
experiments and rhetoric/argumentation. It will show that the first view, according to which 
experimental results should be free from any kind of argumentation, is a contingent historical 
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product – one of the rhetorical/argumentative practices that were applied to secure the 
authority of experiments in science. In Section 3, we will outline a metatheoretical framework 
which can be supposed to solve (P2) and (P1). Finally, in Section 4 we will present our 
solutions to the two problems. 
2 A brief history of the relationship between rhetoric/argumentation and 
scientific experiments 
The argumentative/rhetorical tools1 applied in experiments as well as the role they fulfil have 
undergone several changes during the history of science.2 This is mainly due to the variety of 
ways in which science has been practised and reflected upon.  
Experiments were first applied in the 17th century when it became clear that pure 
reasoning, speculation, passive observation, and reference to ancient authorities or to religious 
dogmas were no longer capable of providing relevant information about nature. Artificial 
situations were created, but the usability of experiments and the acceptability of the results 
were fiercely debated: 
The new “experimental philosophy” was greeted with scepticism on two different grounds. Its critics 
pointed out two difficulties with regard to experimentation. First, in contrast to the phenomena that could 
be observed with the unaided senses, the phenomena created by experiment were neither familiar nor 
accessible to everyone. Second, it was unclear why the manipulation of nature by means of instruments 
would reveal, rather than distort, its workings. Those difficulties were two aspects of the same issue, 
namely the authentication of experimental results; an issue which had to be resolved before 
experimentation could become a proper foundation for natural philosophy. (Arabatzis 2008: 160) 
Solely to imagine the processes that might take place under the given circumstances was felt to 
be unsatisfactory. Thus, the authority of experiments had to be secured by the conduct of the 
experiment, that is, by the replacement of thought experiments by real ones, as well as by 
diverse rhetorical tools. One method was that scientists listed the names of prominent people 
who had been present at the experiment. Thus, the authority of the experimenter and the 
witnesses played a decisive role in the appraisal of the experimental results. This was, of course, 
the application of the earlier rhetorical strategy of reference to authorities to the new method. 
Another strategy, elaborated Boyle, was also a rhetorical tool insofar as he gave a vivid and 
detailed account of every phase of the experimental process in order to make the reader, as 
Cantor (1989: 163) coins it, a virtual witness. This strategy has a medieval counterpart as well: 
narratives in medieval chronicles, as Schiffrin (1981: 59) explains, applied the shift to the 
historical present as an argumentation technique functioning as an “internal evaluation device: it 
allows the narrator to present events as if they were occurring at that moment, so that the 
audience can hear for itself what happened, and can interpret for itself the significance of those 
events for the experience.”3 Nevertheless, the application of this tool was a very important shift 
in the role of ‘witnessing’, since the source of the rhetorical power of the experiment was no 
longer based on authority but on the (real or only conceived) reproducibility of the procedure.  
A later, far-reaching move was the use of an impersonal style by relying on the dominance of 
mathematical tools, schematisation and formalisation. This was intended to create the impression 
that the authority of experimental results stems directly from nature, without (subjective) human 
                                                 
1  In this section, the terms ‘rhetorical’ and ‘argumentative’ will be used in a pre-explicative sense. 
2  Cf. Cantor (1989: 162ff.), Gooding (2000: 117ff.), Arabatzis (2008: 159ff.). 
3  For more on this, see Nagy C. (2014). 
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intervention and interpretation. This style, however, has also led to fragmentariness: several 
details of the experimental process being dismissed from the experimental report. 
Despite this, of course, it was often the case that the presented arguments (calculations, 
formal/mathematical methods, the experimental design, the interpretation of the results) or the 
devices applied have been criticised. Therefore, the experimental reports have been also 
extended to new elements such as the identification of possible systematic errors and the 
description of the measures taken for their prevention, statistical analyses enabling the 
elimination of effects of unavoidable sources of noise, etc. These arguments have grown in 
importance and have become regarded as decisive factors in judging the acceptability of 
experimental results. At the same time, the description of the experimental procedure became 
more theory-oriented. 
Thus, the experimental report is considerably richer than the experimental procedure itself 
was, but, at the same time, it remains strongly schematic and informationally reduced. Namely, 
the experimenter selects the relevant moves and events which are accounted for in the 
experimental report; she/he has the privilege of deciding what counts as an accidental, contingent 
mistake which may remain unmentioned and, on the other hand, what has to be regarded as a 
systematic error that has to be reported together with its correction. A highly instructive and 
often cited example for the gap between the “real” happenings in the laboratory and their 
accounting for in the experimental report is Millikan’s celebrated, historic oil drop experiment: 
Yet extant laboratory notebooks also sometimes indicate more interesting mismatches between laboratory 
practice and published reports. Holton, for example, has drawn attention to Robert Millikan’s selection of 
acceptable results for his oil-drop experiment. During one series of experiments Millikan omitted well 
over half of his results, retaining data from only 58 drops out of a total of about 140. Against some runs 
he annotated comments such as “Beauty. Publish this surely, beautiful”, whereas in other cases he 
dismissed the run with “Error high will not use”, or some such remark. His reasons for accepting some 
runs and not others are complex: sometimes parts of this apparatus did not appear to function properly, on 
other occasions the result was not sufficiently close to the emergent value for e, the electronic charge. 
[…] contrary to the manuscript evidence, Millikan announced in his paper: “It is to be remarked, too, that 
his is not a selected group of drops but represents all of the drops experimented on during 60 consecutive 
days…”. (Cantor 1989: 159; emphasis as in the original) 
There are, of course, norms – partly formulated explicitly, partly only implicit – governing 
experiments as well as experimental reports. The fulfilment of the former, however, cannot be 
checked directly, but only indirectly, with the help of the latter. Nevertheless, as Cantor points out, 
[…] a laboratory notebook and a published journal article are two very different literary forms, serving 
different purposes and subject to different conventions. The published version should not be viewed 
simply as a tidied up version of the laboratory notes, since the former contains many conventional 
elements that would find no place in the latter. The publication is a retrospective narrative, an impersonal, 
passive reconstruction which draws attention to those theories, tests and data which are considered 
appropriate for consumption by the scientific community. (Cantor 1989: 160) 
This has significant consequences for the evaluation of experiments as data sources. It is the 
scientific community that decides whether the experimental results are reliable and 
epistemologically useful, that is, whether they can be used for theory testing, explanation, 
elaboration of new theories etc. This decision is based not on the analysis of the experimental 
procedure itself but only on the judgement of the experimental report produced by the 
experimenter. From this it follows that the rhetorical power of the latter is a decisive factor in 
this case, too. 
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Although this historical overview is somewhat fragmentary, it clearly shows that the norms 
related to the acceptability of experiments have undergone several changes. Moreover, there are 
different norms in different branches of science which are often contested. The same holds true 
of the rhetorical/argumentative aspects of experimental reports as well. That is, the structure and 
the rhetorical/argumentative tools applied in experimental reports are social products as well. 
At this point, of course, the question arises of whether it is possible to elaborate a meta-
theoretical model of scientific experiments that is capable of accounting for the relationship 
between the experimental process and the (argumentative) experimental report. This model 
has to allow for an evaluation of the reliability of the experimental process on the basis of the 
arguments presented in the experimental report. 
3 A possible metatheoretical framework 
3.1 Components of the experimental process 
According to current literature on the philosophy of science, experiments are remarkably 
complex entities. They comprise several ontologically diverse components such as: 
– experimental design: a comprehensive preliminary description of the process of 
experimentation – practically, a thought experiment, providing conjectures about the 
outcome of the experimental procedure; 
– experimental procedure: a material procedure where an experimental apparatus is set up, 
and its working is monitored and recorded under controlled circumstances; 
– a theoretical model of the phenomena investigated: a description of low-level theoretical 
constructs (phenomena) that may be relevant in judging hypotheses about high-level 
theoretical constructs or require theoretical explanation; 
– a theoretical model of the experimental apparatus: explanations about how phenomena are 
created or separated from the background, which of their properties can be detected with 
the help of the equipment, and why it can be supposed that the perceptual data produced by 
the apparatus are stable and reliable; 
– authentication of perceptual data: evaluation of the outcome of the experimental 
procedure, and the experimenter’s decision as to whether the experimental apparatus has 
been working properly so that perceptual data (records of measurements, photographs etc.) 
are stable and reliable; checking of whether sources of noise have been ruled out, or their 
effect can at least be eliminated with the help of statistical methods; 
– interpretation of perceptual data: establishing a connection between the perceptual data 
gained and the phenomena investigated. It has to be decided whether the former are 
relevant, real and reliable in relation to the latter;  
– presentation of experimental results: since experiments are not private but public affairs 
aimed at supplying data for scientific theorising, it is not only the results of the experiment 
which have to be put forward, but also every element of the experimental procedure that is 
judged relevant to the evaluation and acknowledgement of the results. Therefore, the 
experimenter has to present an argumentation that conforms to certain norms. It should 
contain all information that may have any significance for the scientific community in 
enabling them to decide whether the experimental results are reliable and 
epistemologically useful, that is, whether they can be used for theory testing, explanation, 
elaboration of new theories etc. To this end, relevant pieces of information have to be 
selected and arranged into a well-built chain of arguments leading from the previous 
  
Csilla Rákosi: On the rhetoricity of psycholinguistic experiments 
Argumentum 10 (2014), 533-547 
Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó 
539 
problems raised through the description of the experimental design and the experimental 
procedure to the evaluation (authentication and interpretation) of data. Thus, experimental 
data should be suitable for integration into the process of scientific theorising.  
 
From this short characterisation it is clear that experiments involve a highly complex network 
of activities, physical objects, argumentation processes, interpretative techniques, background 
knowledge, methods, norms, etc. The reliability of the outcome of an experiment depends on 
the reliability of its components as well as the fit between them and pre-existing knowledge.  
A very important insight of the current literature on scientific experiments is that neither 
single experiments nor repetitions of the experimentation process are capable of yielding 
ultimate and unquestionable results. It is not only the previous considerations and the 
planning of the experiment which are fallible – the control of the experimental process and the 
evaluation of the results are to some extent unavoidably uncertain as well. Therefore, 
experiments are open processes in the sense that, in possession of new pieces of information, 
they may be continued, modified, or even discarded. 
From this it follows that the experimental process should be viewed as a search for the best 
fit achievable between the experimental design, the theory of the experimental apparatus, the 
process of experimentation, the perceptual data gained, the authentication and interpretation 
of the latter, the theory of the phenomenon investigated, etc.4 To find this fit, one has, in most 
cases, to turn back to earlier stages of the experimentation process and modify some 
component. Every component can be revised and the revisions have to be repeated again and 
again till there is mutual support among the constituents. See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The structure of experiments 
                                                 
4  See, for example, Pickering (1989), Hacking (1992: 56). 
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3.2 Argumentative aspects of experiments 
Let us take a closer look at the process of searching for the best fit among the components of 
the experimental process from the point of view of the experimenter. 
Hypotheses used in the experimental design, the theoretical model of the phenomena and 
of the apparatus make up the starting point of the experimental process. They are not true with 
certainty but they are supported to some extent by theoretical considerations, by earlier 
experiments, or are simply (reasonable) conjectures. They allow for a rough estimation of the 
outcome of the experiment. After the experimental procedure, in possession of the perceptual 
data, this preliminary guess may be strengthened. Nevertheless, it may happen that the 
perceptual data cannot be interpreted properly, or they seem to be in conflict with the 
predictions. In such cases, the reliability of the previously accepted hypotheses also has to be 
revised. 
The interpretation and authentication of the perceptual data may also indicate shortcomings 
in the experimental procedure, in the experimental design, or in the theoretical model of the 
phenomena or of the apparatus. Therefore, all facets of the experiment conducted have to be 
re-examined, and, if it seems to be necessary, control experiments have to be carried out, or 
the experimental design has to be modified and the experiment repeated. Moreover, even the 
interpretation or the authentication of the perceptual data itself may be faulty and be in need 
of modification. 
From this it follows that revealing the connections between the statements capturing 
different aspects of the experimental procedure and their analysis, as well as the 
comprehensiveness of the checks and cross-checks are of crucial importance.  
This characterisation of the experimental process will motivate us to raise the hypothesis 
that experiments are cyclic processes organised and conducted by an argumentation process 
which tries to clarify the relationship among hypotheses of the experimental design, the 
theoretical model of phenomena, the theoretical model of the experimental apparatus, the 
theory under test and its rivals, as well as statements describing the events of the experimental 
procedure, or which capture the results of the interpretation and authentication of perceptual 
data etc. This motivates us to modify Figure 1 in the following way. 
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Figure 2: The structure of experiments – revised 
 
The argumentation process organising the conduct and control of the experiment is a central 
issue in judging the reliability of the experimental results. This argumentation process does 
not consist of deductive inferences because it takes into consideration the uncertainty of the 
statements as well. It is not public; rather, it is a private affair of the experimenters. Despite 
this, it is indirectly influenced by the public norms applicable to experiments. Thus, 
experimenters have first to convince themselves of the reliability and acceptability of the 
outcome of the experiment and, after this, they have to persuade the scientific community as 
well. This means that the researcher has to transform this private argumentation process into 
a public experimental report. 
If we turn to the reader’s perspective, we can establish that the evaluation of experimental 
results can only start from the experimental report, which is an edited, transformed version of the 
non-public argumentation process. While the latter is part of an ontologically complex process of 
scientific experiment, the former is purely argumentative. It is a mixture: it contains elements or 
traces of the original argumentation process as well as the argumentative tools needed to make 
this reduced set of information coherent, comprehensible and persuasive for the reader. 
3.3 Modelling of the argumentative aspects of experiments 
At this point, of course, the question arises of which metatheoretical tool enables us to 
reconstruct and evaluate the argumentation process which governs the experimental process 
and the experimental report, as well as the relationship between them. A purely logical 
analysis would not suffice because it is formal and is not capable of grasping information 
related to the uncertainty and reliability of statements. This motivates the application of the p-
model, elaborated in Kertész & Rákosi (2012).5 
                                                 
5  For further applications of the p-model to experiments, see Rákosi (2011a, b, 2012), Kertész & Rákosi (2012: 
Part IV), Kertész & Kiefer (2013), Kertész & Rákosi (2014). 
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3.3.1 The uncertainty of information in experiments: plausible statements 
The p-model – following Rescher (1976) – does not interpret scientific hypotheses as propo-
sitions but assigns them a structure consisting of an information content and a plausibility 
value. The plausibility value of a statement indicates the extent to which its information 
content is supported, is made reliable by a given source, and as a result, to the extent to which 
we are ready to accept it.  
In connection with psycholinguistic experiments, the following plausibility rankings may 
be applied – of course, this list is only a sample of possible rankings:  
 
|p|D = 0, that is, the statement p has neutral plausibility according to the experimental design 
abbreviated as D, if the experimental design does not allow the risk of even a rough 
estimate for the plausibility of the statement p, and neither p nor its negation is 
supported by D; 
|p|K = 0.2, that is, p has low plausibility according to the experimenter’s knowledge 
abbreviated as K, if p is the experimenters’ previous, untested and vague conjecture 
about the outcome of the experiment; 
|p|E1 = 0.4, that is, p has a rather low plausibility according to an earlier experiment abbreviated 
as E1, if p results from an experiment, but some possible sources of noise which may 
cause systematic errors have not yet been ruled out with the help of control experiments; 
|p|E2 = 0.6, that is, p has a rather high plausibility according to an experiment E2, if p results 
from a well-designed experiment with a thorough authentication of the perceptual data; 
|p|T = 0.8, that is, p has a high plausibility according to a theory abbreviated as T, if p is a 
central, generally accepted hypothesis of the given theory which has already been 
tested with the help of linguistic, corpus linguistic, psycholinguistic etc. investigations; 
|p|M = 1, that is, p can be regarded as true with certainty on the basis of a mathematical 
theory M, if p is a mathematical theorem proven in M. 
 
It has to be stressed that low plausibility values do not mean a statement is improbable but 
rather that it has a relatively small, limited amount of plausibility (reliability, acceptance). In 
such cases, the source votes expressly for the given hypothesis. If a source is against a 
hypothesis then it makes its negation plausible and the given hypothesis implausible or even 
false with certainty; that is, in such cases 0 < |~h|S ≤ 1.  
 
The concept of ‘plausibility value’ allows us to represent and compare the acceptability 
(reliability) of statements such as previous conjectures, perceptual data, experimental data, 
hypotheses of linguistic theories, hypotheses about linguistic phenomena, etc. The 
experimenter’s hypothesis about the correctness of the experimental design or about the 
flawless functioning of the measuring devices can also be only plausible but not certainly true. 
From the experimenter’s point of view this means that the non-public argumentation process 
which organises and conducts the experimental process deals with uncertain, fallible pieces of 
information. From the reader’s perspective this means that the experimental report consists of 
plausible but, in most cases, not certainly true statements. Moreover, the concept of 
‘plausibility’ makes it possible to compare the plausibility value which can be assigned to 
statements on the basis of the identification of their source on the one hand, and the value 
which they receive in the experimental report on the other. If the latter values are higher than 
the former, then this indicates an unwarranted overestimation of the plausibility of certain 
hypotheses or data and leads to a fallacious argumentation. 
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3.3.2 Sources of plausibility 
We distinguish direct and indirect sources. In the case of direct sources, the plausibility of the 
statement at issue is evaluated with respect to the reliability of its source, as above. Indirect 
sources yield the plausibility value of the given statement on the basis of the plausibility of 
other statements – that is, via plausible inferences. Plausible inferences take into 
consideration not only the logical structure of the premises and the conclusion but their 
plausibility values and semantic structure as well. They always rest on a semantic relation: for 
example, causality, analogy, similarity, sign, necessary or sufficient condition, part-whole 
relation etc., and are not necessarily deductively valid.  
 
The perfect identification of the direct and indirect sources from which the plausibility of the 
data and other hypotheses in experimental reports originate makes it possible to check and re-
evaluate the plausibility of the statements at issue. Specifically, the reconstruction of the 
plausible inferences (indirect sources) applied in the experimental report may reveal latent 
background assumptions that are implausible instead of being plausible or of neutral 
plausibility. It may happen that an inference relies on a hypothesis that is solely a conjecture 
but which on closer examination turns out to be implausible or false. In such cases the 
conclusion loses its plausibility as well – and the same holds true of the inferences that made 
use of the conclusion of this inference as a premise. This kind of reconstruction may be 
especially useful for the authentication of the perceptual data as well as for establishing a link 
between the experimental data and the hypotheses of a theory. In both cases the connection 
between the perceptual data and the experimental data and between the experimental data and 
theoretical hypotheses relies mostly on deductively invalid plausible inferences that make use 
of latent background assumptions. 
3.3.3 Conflicting information in scientific experiments: p-inconsistency 
An important property of the above concept of plausibility is that it allows a statement to be 
plausible on the basis of some sources and implausible on the basis of others at the same time. 
Such cases are called p-inconsistencies. 
 
Thus, a hypothesis may be made plausible by an experiment as a source but implausible by 
another one. Similarly, different theories may judge the acceptability of a given scientific 
claim differently, or an experiment may refute a prediction, etc. – leading to different cases of 
p-inconsistency. 
 
The decision between conflicting hypotheses cannot be reduced to the mechanical comparison 
of their plausibility values. Instead, one has to evaluate statements along with the reliability of 
the sources making them plausible, their relationship to other statements, to the related 
methodological norms and so on – that is, the system of relations of the rival hypotheses has 
to be revealed and compared as a whole. Such constellations are called the p-context.  
 
According to the p-model, inconsistencies must not be viewed as fatal failures but indications 
that either the experiment or the theory at issue (or even both) is in need of some kind of 
modification. Thus, conflicting experimental results, contradictions between predictions and 
experimental data, inconsistencies between the hypotheses of a theory and the results of an 
experiment, and other discrepancies among the components of the experimental process are 
  
Csilla Rákosi: On the rhetoricity of psycholinguistic experiments 
Argumentum 10 (2014), 533-547 
Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó 
544 
concomitants of experiments. Nevertheless, there are always several possible causes of a 
conflict, whose identification may require several attempts. In most cases, inconsistencies are 
not resolved by simply giving up one of the conflicting statements but more comprehensive 
revisions are needed that may affect further components of the experiment as well. 
3.3.4 Solutions and the resolution of p-inconsistencies 
In order to resolve a p-inconsistency, one has to re-evaluate the p-context. A solution of a p-
inconsistency is achieved if a p-context has been arrived at in which (a) the statement in 
question is unanimously supported or opposed by the sources – that is, it has become either 
plausible or implausible (or even certainly true or false) on the basis of all sources in the 
given p-context –, or (b) the statements causing inconsistency are represented separately and 
this separation is systematic and well-motivated. 
It is possible, however, that a p-inconsistency has several solutions. This necessitates the 
introduction of the notion of the resolution of a p-inconsistency. This means that one finds a 
solution of the given p-inconsistency which is, when compared with other solutions, the best 
on the basis of a particular set of accepted criteria, and according to the information available 
for us in the given p-context. It may be the case, however, that in a given information state 
one can only show that for the time being there is no resolution achievable. 
It is of vital importance that inconsistencies are not put aside without finding a solution 
which makes it possible to separate the conflicting statements, at least provisionally. Instead, 
one has to try to elaborate and compare as many solutions as possible in order to find the best 
solution available under the given information state.  
 
The reliability of an experiment as a data source is largely determined by careful and strict 
identification of the inconsistencies among its components, by the number, variety, and 
comprehensiveness of the investigated solutions as well as by the choice of the resolution of 
the conflicts revealed during the experimental process. Since the p-model describes several 
strategies of inconsistency resolution, its application may contribute to the elaboration and 
conduct of better experiments in linguistics. 
3.3.5 Cyclic revisions in scientific experiments: plausible argumentation 
To achieve the solutions or the resolution of a given p-inconsistency, one needs a heuristic tool 
that makes it possible to re-evaluate the p-context and to find and compare the solutions to its 
problems. This heuristic tool is what we will call plausible argumentation. In simple terms, 
plausible argumentation is the transformation of a problematic p-context into one that is no 
longer (or at least, less) problematic. This involves the successive re-evaluation of a problematic 
p-context by the elaboration of possible solutions to its problems, the evaluation of the alternative 
solutions and the comparison of the latter. Its aim is the detection of all available solutions and the 
decision as to which of them is to be accepted as the resolution of the given p-problem. 
The above characterisation of plausible argumentation indicates that the argumentation 
process is basically not linear but cyclic, because the re-evaluation of a problematic p-context 
usually does not lead immediately to an unproblematic one but may raise new problems. This 
may require the revision of previous decisions, the assessment of other alternatives etc. 
Therefore, throughout the argumentation process one returns to the problems at issue again 
and again, and re-evaluates the earlier decisions about the acceptance or rejection of 
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statements, the reliability of the sources, the plausibility values of the statements, the 
workability of methodological norms, the conclusions previously reached by inferences etc. 
 
The p-model’s concept of ‘plausible argumentation’ allows us to interpret both the 
argumentation organising and conducting the experimental process and the experimental report 
as pieces of plausible argumentation. The experimental report should not simply summarise 
and make public the results of the former but make it possible for the reader to continue the 
non-public argumentation process. That is, a good experimental report is informative enough 
to allow the reader to add new argumentation cycles to the non-public argumentation process.  
Thus, for example, the reliability of an experiment crucially depends on the question of to 
what extent the experimental data may be supposed to be free of systematic errors. In experiments 
on metaphor processing, by the application of an offline measure, participants might have made 
use of conscious strategic considerations distorting the results, or semantic priming effects lead to 
faulty results, etc. Therefore, when the experimenter suspects or reveals the presence of such a 
factor, then he/she has to carry out control experiments and/or revise the experimental design and 
start a new cycle of revision. Nevertheless, one cannot check and rule out the presence of every 
possible systematic error. The set of the factors that might have influenced the outcome of the 
experiment is always open. From this it follows that even a good experiment may contain 
systematic errors that can be revealed only later by some other member of the scientific 
community. Thus, good experiments are characterised not only by the thoroughness of the 
elimination of possible errors but are also inspirational and motivate the search for more complex 
explanations of the investigated phenomena. They pave the way for new experiments that take 
into consideration further factors and for the elaboration of more refined theoretical models. 
4 The solution to (P1) and (P2) 
On the basis of our analyses presented in Section 3, we obtain the following solution to (P2): 
 
(S2) Experiments have a dual argumentative character. The experimental process is 
organised and conducted by a non-public plausible argumentation process that is then 
transformed into the experimental report, that is, a public piece of plausible 
argumentation. This transformation can be regarded as acceptable if it does not change 
the plausibility value of the hypotheses of the original, non-public argumentation. This 
can be achieved if the experimental report contains all information that might be 
relevant for the evaluation of the steps of the experimental process. This means that the 
reader has to be in a position to reconstruct and continue the non-public argumentation 
process to the greatest extent possible. In this way, the reader can be made a virtual 
participant of the creation, analysis and evaluation of the perceptual data. This means 
that he/she has to be equipped to reconstruct not only the experimental procedure but 
the interpretation and authentication of the perceptual data and the significant steps of 
the argumentation process organising the elaboration of the experimental results. 
 
This solution to (P2) makes it possible to resolve the rhetorical paradox of psycholinguistic 
experiments as follows: 
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(S1) The reliability of psycholinguistic experiments as data sources can be judged on the 
basis of the argumentation theoretical analysis of the experimental report with the help 
of the p-model. The p-model provides tools for, among others 
(a) revealing the sources from which the plausibility of the data and other hypotheses 
used in experimental reports originate. In this way, the points where plausibility 
values enter the argumentation process can be identified and their reliability 
evaluated; 
(b) representing the acceptability of statements as plausibility values. In this way, it 
can be determined which sources make the statements in experimental reports 
plausible or implausible, and to what extent; 
(c) determining the plausibility value of conclusions of inferences with premises that 
are not true with certainty but only plausible to some extent. Thus, not only the 
impact of direct sources on the plausibility of the statements can be represented, 
but the impact of plausible or implausible statements on each other as well; 
(d) comparing and summarising the plausibility value of hypotheses stemming from 
different sources. Therefore, the dynamism of the change in the plausibility of 
data and hypotheses can be accounted for; 
(e) representing the emergence of inconsistencies and the strategies applied to their 
resolution as plausible argumentation processes. Organising all information at hand 
(data, sources, hypotheses, inferences, methodological tools, methodological norms 
etc.), with the introduction of the notion of ‘plausible argumentation’, the p-model 
tries to model the comprehensive effect of every change in the informational state; 
(f) comparing and evaluating different solutions to the problems revealed via 
differentiating between effective (plausible, cyclic and prismatic) and ineffective 
(fallacious, circular) argumentation. 
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